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This paper studies the effect of political uncertainty on the choice of debt 
sources. We find a positive relationship between political uncertainty 
stemming from elections and the proportion of bank loans over total debts, 
especially when elections are closely contested. Furthermore, this 
relationship is stronger in opaque firms and more financially constrained 
firms as well as firms from countries with weaker shareholder rights, labor 
protection, creditor rights and national governance. 
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Political outcomes affect the regulatory policies that shape the external environment under 
which firms operate. As documented in a large strand of literature, political uncertainty, such as a 
change in government policy and national leadership, is one of the principal means by which 
politics affects corporate decisions. Prior research studied the effect of political uncertainty on 
investment (e.g., Durnev, 2014; Jens, 2017), dividend payouts (Huang, Wu, Yu, and Zhang, 2015), 
foreign direct investments (FDI – Nguyen, Kim and Papanastassiou, 2018), leverage ratio (Cao, 
Duan, and Uysal, 2013), corporate credit risk (Liu and Zhong, 2017; Kaviani, Kryzanowski, and 
Maleki, 2017), industry return volatility (Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov, 2012), stock 
price and equity risk premia (Pastor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013), IPO activity (e.g., Colak, Durnev, 
and Qian, 2017), option pricing (Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi, 2016), stock price crash risk (e.g., Li, 
Li and Xu, 2018). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the relationship between 
political uncertainty and the choice of debt source yet. Examining debt choice rather than the 
amount of total debt is important because while the total amount of debt may not change over 
time, its composition (i.e., the allocation of debt between a bank and public debt) may change.  We 
exploit recently available data on debt structure in Capital IQ to analyze the effect of political 
uncertainty stemming from national elections on the choice between public and bank debt. Most of 
prior studies on debt choice study the role of characteristics of the firm, like financial 
characteristics (e.g., Denis and Mihov, 2003), ownership structure (Lin, Ma, Malatesta and Xuan, 
2013; Boubaker, et al., 2017; Boubakri and Saffar, 2018) and product market competition (e.g., 
Boubaker, Rouatbi and Sassi, 2018).  We augment these studies by highlighting the importance of 
political uncertainty stemming from national elections for debt structure. Firms from different 
countries have different reactions to elections, allowing us to study how different is the reaction of 
firms from countries with a different institutional environment to national elections. Therefore, 
national elections provide us with a natural experiment, permitting us to explore the relationship 
between political uncertainty and debt structure. 
Elections are associated with severe information asymmetry problems as they are 
accompanied by high uncertainty about the policies of the government, such as those regarding 
taxation and labor regulations, which can affect the firm’s competitiveness as well as its expected 
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cash flow. As argued by Imai and Shelton (2011, p. 837), elections constitute “opportunities for 
large, discrete changes in governments and therefore in governing philosophy and resulting 
policy.” Information asymmetry increases capital rationing and limits the ability of the firm to 
raise capital in the public debt markets. Cao et al. (2013) provide evidence consistent with this 
view. They show that in an election year, capital providers give less credit to firms and require 
higher credit spreads. This finding suggests that creditors that are uncertain about government 
policies that could affect firms’ cash flow provide less credit to firms and require a higher rate of 
return, which increases the cost of borrowing. 
Similarly, Gao and Qi (2013) find that political uncertainty around U.S. gubernatorial 
elections is associated with an increase of 6 to 8 basis points in municipal bond yields. Recently, 
Nagar, Schoenfeld and Wellman (2019) find that economic-political uncertainty decreases the 
quality of firms' information environments. The authors report that managers try to reduce 
information asymmetry caused by economic-political uncertainty with additional voluntary 
disclosures; however, their disclosures are not enough, and a strong positive link between 
economic-political uncertainty and information asymmetry remains. Banks are efficient at 
monitoring and are less sensitive to information asymmetry. Indeed, banks who hold private 
information on firms play better monitoring of managers’ actions than public debtholders. 
Furthermore, banks have stronger monitoring incentives than public debtholders because 
debt ownership is more dispersed in public debt markets; hence, public debtholders are more 
likely to suffer from free-rider problems. Moreover, bank debt has an advantage over public debt 
because debt restructuring and renegotiation is easier in bank debt than compared to public debt. 
Thus, firms can still access bank debt facing problems such as agency and information asymmetry 
problems. We, therefore, expect that firms to use more bank debt during national elections because 
debtholders will require higher compensation when information asymmetry costs are high.  
Using a multinational sample over the period from 1990–2015, we find that firms use more 
bank debt during election years. This result supports the view that elections that are associated 
with high political uncertainty aggravate the information asymmetry problem and render public 
debt more costly and less accessible. Our findings are robust to a battery of robustness tests and 
the use of alternative political uncertainty proxies. We also perform several cross-sectional tests to 
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identify the factors that may affect the positive relation between national elections and bank debt 
ratio. We discover this relation to be more pronounced in opaque firms. 
Furthermore, we find that this relationship is stronger when the financial constraints faced 
by firms are more severe. Additionally, we realize this relation to be more profound in firms from 
countries with weaker shareholder rights, labor protection, creditor rights protection and weaker 
national governance. Last but not least, we find this relation to be more important when elections 
are closely contested, which adds more credence to the positive relationship between political 
uncertainty and the loan to debt ratio. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, our results enrich the 
emerging literature on political uncertainty (e.g., Ben-Nasr et al., 2014; Frankie, Deesomsak and 
Wang, 2014; Smales, 2014; Julio and Yook, 2012; Durnev, 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Cao et al., 2013; 
Colak et al., 2017; Kaviani et al., 2017; Kelly et al., 2016; Cao, Li and Liu, 2015; An, Chen, Luo, and 
Zhang. 2016; Li et al., 2018; Guo, Li and Zhong, 2019) by focusing on an important financial 
decision, namely the choice between the bank and public debt financing. In contrast to Colak, 
Gungoraydinoglu, and Öztekin (2018), who examine the impact of political uncertainty on the 
total amount of debt, this study enhances the understanding of political uncertainty on the 
composition of debt sources. Studying the composition of debt is important because it may change 
over time while the total amount of debt remains constant (e.g., Rauh and Sufi, 2010). Second, we 
also augment debt structure and cost studies (e.g., Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam, 1999; 
Dhaliwal, Khurana, and Pereira, 2011; Lin, Malatesta and Xuan, 2013; Boubaker et al., 2017 and 
2018; Li et al., 2015; Boubaker et al., 2018; Pour and Lasfer, 2019; Meng and Yin, 2019; Ben-Nasr, 
2019) by examining how policy risk, proxied by national elections, may affect bank debt ratio 
which has generally been ignored to date. In this study, we identify a new determinant for 
corporate debt structure from a macro aspect.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and 
develops our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes our empirical design. Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Literature review and hypotheses  
Elections are associated with uncertainty regarding the new government’s policies (e.g., 
subsidies, allocation of government contracts, taxation, and labor policies), which can affect a 
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firm’s expected cash flow and competitiveness. This uncertainty aggravates information 
asymmetry problems.  Periods of political instability are associated with severe information 
asymmetry, which increases market participants’ perception of risk. Several studies provide 
evidence suggesting that political uncertainty around elections is associated with higher 
information asymmetry. For instance, Pasquariello and Zafeiridou (2014) examine the impact of 
U.S. presidential elections on financial market quality. They find that presidential elections 
decrease trading volume and market liquidity, suggesting that political uncertainty is associated 
with poor and lower quality information environment. Similarly, Dai and Ngo (2019) examine the 
impact of U.S. gubernatorial elections on accounting conservatism. They argue that managers are 
better than external investors in evaluating the impact of political uncertainty on the incomes and 
expenses of the company, which leads to an increase in the information asymmetry between 
insiders and external investors. 
Higher information asymmetry leads to more conservative accounting (LaFond & Watts, 
2008; Khan & Watts, 2009). Consistent with this view, they find that gubernatorial elections lead to 
an increase in asymmetric timeliness of news recognition. Durnev (2014) examines the impact of 
national elections on stock price informativeness using a sample of 79 countries. He argues that 
national elections associated with uncertainty regarding government policies lead to uncertain 
future cash flows, which leads to less informative stock prices. In addition, he argues that the gap 
related to the access to information between managers and external investors regarding the impact 
of potential changes in government policies on future firm cash flows increases during national 
elections. Consistent with these views, he finds that national elections are positively related to 
stock price synchronicity, suggesting that stock prices are more correlated with market indexes, 
hence less informative during national elections. 
Less informative stock prices are associated with higher information asymmetry (e.g., Wang, 
1994). Prior literature provides support for this view. For instance, Jin and Myers (2006) report 
evidence (from a sample of 40 countries) suggesting that more synchronous (less informative) 
stock prices are associated with less corporate transparency. In the same vein, Hutton, Marcus, 
and Tehranian (2009) show that less informative stock prices are associated with more earnings 
management from a sample of 43 countries. 
Higher quality of accounting information mitigates information asymmetry problems 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Furthermore, Li, Li and Xu (2018) show that national elections 
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are positively related with the likelihood to withhold bad news (in a sample of 38 countries) as 
measured by stock price crash risk, suggesting that national elections are associated with more 
asymmetry of information between insiders and external investors. More recently, Nagar et al. 
(2019) use economic-political uncertainty (EPU index) as a measure of policy uncertainty. From a 
sample of U.S. firms, they find that higher policy uncertainty is associated with higher information 
asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread and prices react less to earnings surprises.1  
 Political uncertainty, which is associated with higher information asymmetry, affects the 
capital structure and debt cost. For instance, Cao et al. (2013) argue that creditors who are 
uncertain about the cash flows of firms due to government instability provide less credit and 
require a higher rate of return, which lead to higher borrowing cost. Consistent with this 
argument, they show that under conditions of political uncertainty, firms need more time to adjust 
their leverages toward targets. Indeed, they demonstrate that under-levered (over-levered) firms 
are less (more) likely to increase (decrease) their debt ratios during periods of political uncertainty. 
They also show that firms tend to delay debt issuances in periods of high political uncertainty. 
More importantly, they show that political uncertainty increases credit spreads. In the same vein, 
Gao and Qi (2013) show that political uncertainty around U.S. gubernatorial elections is linked 
with an increase of 6 to 8 basis points in municipal bond yields. Colak et al. (2018) use a 
multinational sample of firms from 38 countries and various proxies of political uncertainty 
including the election dummy. They find that political uncertainty decreases the speed of leverage 
adjustments. Overall, this discussion suggests that political uncertainty is associated with severe 
information asymmetry, which increases financial friction and leads to higher public financing 
costs. In this paper, we extend this strand of literature by examining the impact of political 
                                                          
1  This study empirically test whether national elections is associated with higher information asymmetry 
by using the EPU index and a U.S. sample. We calculate the Amihud Illiquidity proxy for our sample 
firms. We regress the Amihud Illiquidity proxy on on ELEC_DUMMY, the volatility of monthly stock 
returns (RET_VOL), turnover (TURNOVER), the logarithm of dollar trading volume (DTV) and 
logarithm of stock prices (Log(1+PRICE)). DTV is defined as the logarithm of one plus trading volume 
multiplied by stock price, PRICE is stock price. The results of our Model 1 (available upon request) 
show that ELEC_DUMMY loads positive and highly significant, suggesting that information 
asymmetry increases during national elections. Furthermore, we use subsample analysis to examine the 
validity of information asymmetry channel through which national election affect firm’s debt choice. 
The results of our Models 2 and 3 (also available on request) show that the coefficient for 
ELEC_DUMMY is significantly in the sub-sample of firms with high Amihud Illiquidity ratio, 
suggesting that the positive relationship between national elections and bank debt ratio is more 
pronounced in the sub-sample of firms suffering from severe information asymmetry problems in line 
with H2 (described below).  
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uncertainty on the composition of firm debt. 
Several studies examine the determinants of choice between public and private debt (e.g., 
Ben-Nasr, 2019; Boubaker et al., 2018). They argue that banks are more efficient at monitoring and 
are less sensitive to information asymmetry than public debtholders. For instance, banks are 
known for their superior monitoring ability since they can easily access private firm information 
(Diamond, 1984). Moreover, the monitoring incentives of banks are higher than those of public 
debtholders because the ownership of public debt is more dispersed when compared to bank debt 
(Houston and James, 1996). Additionally, banks are less sensitive to information asymmetry 
because they can discipline firms in case of misbehavior through contract renegotiation and 
restructuring (Park, 2000).  
Nikolaev (2018) points out that exogenous uncertainty is thus the primary driver of 
renegotiation. Given a certain level of exogenous uncertainty, because of agency and information 
problems, it is difficult to induce the agent’s endogenous non-contractible actions via ex-ante 
contracts, which creates a need to monitor and discipline the agent ex-post2. Since bank debts are 
less costly than public debts in periods of high information asymmetry(e.g., Li et al., 2015), in line 
with Nikolaev (2018)’s reasoning, Krishnaswami et al. (1999) document that high residual stock 
return volatility (i.e., higher information asymmetry costs) is associated with a high bank debt 
ratio. Similarly, Denis and Mihov (2003) report evidence suggesting that fewer fixed assets (i.e., 
high information asymmetry costs) lead to higher bank debt ratio. In more recent work, Li et al. 
(2015) document that an information shock is associated with higher bank debt use. Thus, we 
expect that firms prefer to use bank debt when information asymmetry is high in the face of 
political uncertainty. 
To summarize, the above arguments suggest that national elections are associated with high 
political uncertainty and tend to aggravate information asymmetry problems, hence increase debt 
rationing and result in a high public debt financing cost. Therefore, we expect that in periods of 
high political uncertainty, firms will rely more on a debt source that is less sensitive to information 
asymmetry, namely bank debt. Our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Firms tend to use more bank debt during election years than during non-election years. 
Information opacity increases public debt costs (e.g., Sengupta, 1998; Mansi, Maxwell and 
Miller, 2011). Indeed, it aggravates moral hazard problems by rendering contracting less efficient 
                                                          
2  See the second paragraph on page 271 on Nikolaev (2018). 
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and impeding effective monitoring by capital suppliers. Similarly, information opacity increases 
information asymmetry costs, hence aggravates adverse selection problems. As discussed above, 
firms facing higher public financing costs may decide to use more bank debt. The reason for this is 
that banks, being efficient monitors and less reliant on publicly available information, are less 
sensitive to information asymmetry problems.  This point of view is supported by the literature. 
For instance, Li et al. (2015) report a positive association between information opacity and bank 
debt ratio. In the same vein, Dhaliwal, Khurana and Pereira (2011) show that firms with less 
disclosure use less public debt. Consequently, we expect that the association between national 
elections and bank debt ratio will be more pronounced in opaque firms.  
H2: The positive relation between national elections and bank debt usage is stronger in 
opaque firms. 
Financial constraints may also affect the impact of national elections on the bank debt ratio. 
Megginson, Ullah, and Wei (2014) argue that agency problems are more severe in firms facing 
more financial constraints. Such firms are more likely to experience bankruptcy, hence have a 
higher public debt cost. The high public debt costs faced by financially constrained firms may lead 
them to substitute away from a financing source that is more sensitive to information asymmetry, 
namely public debt toward bank debt.  Bank debt seems to be more appropriate for firms with 
high bankruptcy risk (e.g., Denis and Mihov, 2003). Consequently, we may expect that financially 
constrained may rely more on bank debt during national elections.  
H3: Financial constraints strengthen the relation between national elections and bank debt 
ratio. 
Legal protection may affect the association between national elections and bank debt ratio. 
We study several aspects of legal protection. First, we explore the role played by shareholder 
rights in protecting external shareholders. Strong legal protection prevents managers from 
expropriating the wealth of shareholders and reduces their need to rely on banks to monitor 
managers. Thus, firms are less likely to use debt from banks in the presence of strong shareholder 
rights. Consequently, we can expect that the positive association between national elections and 
bank debt ratio is weaker (stronger) when the protection of shareholder rights is strong (weak).  
Second, labor protection may also affect the association between national elections and bank 
debt ratio. Firms from countries with strong labor protection tend to hide corporate resources 
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when employees have a high degree of bargaining power, to reduce their ability to extract 
corporate resources in the form of high wages and highly favorable working conditions. For 
instance, Hilary (2006) report evidence suggesting that labor protection and information opacity 
are positively correlated. We expect that in the presence of rigid labor regulations, firms use more 
public debt because banks are better able to detect the opportunistic behavior of managers aiming 
to hide corporate resources from workers. Therefore, we expect a stronger relation between 
political uncertainty and bank debt ratio in the presence of weaker labor regulations. 
Third, we examine whether the relationship between national elections and bank debt ratio 
depends on creditor rights, which protects against borrower expropriation (e.g., Qian and Strahan, 
2007) and leads to lower public debt cost.  For instance, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) show that 
the enforcement of creditor rights is linked with lower credit spreads. Firms in countries with 
weaker creditor rights are penalized with higher public debt costs, hence are more likely to use 
bank debt.  Therefore, we expect that firms that weak creditor rights strengthen the positive 
association between national elections and bank debt ratio.   
H4: The positive association between elections and bank debt ratio is weaker (stronger) 
when the shareholder, labor and creditor rights are strong (weak), respectively. 
We assess the effect of election closeness measured by the victory margin on the relationship 
between national elections and bank debt ratio. A lower value of the victory margin index is 
linked with more electoral uncertainty. National elections that are won by a smaller margin (i.e., 
closely contested elections) are related to a greater decrease in investment (Julio and Yook, 2012). 
Similarly, Durnev (2014) shows that national elections reduce investment-to-price sensitivity more 
when elections are closely contested elections. Colak et al. (2017) document that election closeness 
is associated with a sharper decrease in IPO volume during election years. Electoral uncertainty 
aggravates information asymmetry problems and further increases capital rationing during 
election years; hence, it further increases the cost of public debt. Therefore, we predict that firms 
use less public debt when the results of elections are unexpected. We also explore the role of 
national governance (i.e., voice and accountability and political stability) as proxies for policy 
uncertainty. Policy uncertainty is higher in countries with weaker national governance. Therefore, 
firms located in countries with weak national governance suffering from severe uncertainty use 
more bank debt, which is less sensitive to information asymmetry.  
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H5: The positive relationship between national elections and bank debt ratio is stronger in 
closely contested elections and when national governance is weak. 
3. Description of Data 
3.1 Sample 
To scrutinize the impact of political uncertainty on the choice of debt source, we first collect 
election data from the 2015 Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank. We cross-
check this with that in the Polity IV database.3 When information is missing from Polity IV, we use 
from other sources such as Elections around the World, Election Guide, and The CIA World 
Factbook. Next, we merge the election data with Capital IQ’s debt choice data and Compustat’s 
data on financial variables.  We exclude financial firms to eliminate outliers.  We end up with a 
sample of 219,999 firm-year observations from 35 countries for the period 1990–2015. 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively illustrate the data sources for control variables and the 
descriptive statistics by country. We report the bank debt ratio and the number of elections by 
country. Our sample includes countries from different geographic regions to better allow us to 
analyze the effect of differences in political uncertainty between countries on the choice of debt 
source. As can be seen, the U.S.A. and Japan contribute the largest proportions of the sample. 
Indeed, 33.21% of our firm-year observations are contributed by the U.S.A. and 20.34% by Japan.  
Each of the remaining countries contributes less than 10%.  Our sample firms experience an 
average of three election cycles.  The average bank debt ratio for our sample firms ranges from 
25% for the U.S.A. to 73% for Turkey. 
[Please insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
3.2 Variables 
We use the ratio of bank debt over the total as a dependent variable 
(BANK_LOAN/TOTAL_DEBTi,t). Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the bank debt ratio.  The 
average (median) for BANK_LOAN/TOTAL_DEBTi,t is equal to 0.423 (0.230). 
We use national elections as a proxy for political uncertainty as our main test variable.  
Specifically, we use a dummy variable equal to one if the election is held between  60 days before 
the fiscal year-end and 274 days after the fiscal year-end and zero otherwise (ELEC_DUMMY).  
                                                          
3  Please refer to Julio and Yook (2012, page 51) for a description of Polity IV database. 
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The rationale behind this index is that political uncertainty increases in election years.  Consistent 
with this view, Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) show that their economic-political uncertainty 
index takes a higher value during election years. Table 2 shows that Mexico has the lowest number 
of elections and the U.S.A. has the highest number of elections.  
We control for several variables. First, we control for firm size using the logarithm of total 
assets in U.S.$ (SIZEi,t).  Second, we use the ratio of long-term debt over total assets to control for 
leverage (LEVERAGEi,t). Third, we control for Tobin’s Q, calculated as the sum of the market value 
of equity and the book value of debt over the book value of assets (Qi,t). Fourth, we control for firm 
profitability using the return on assets ratio (ROAi,t). Fifth, we control for property, plant, and 
equipment over the total assets ratio (TANGABILITYi,t). Sixth, we control for financial constraints 
using Altman’s (1968) Z-score. Seventh, we control for information opacity using the number of 
analysts covering the firm (ACOVi,t) and earnings quality (AQi,t) using the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. Finally, we control for macroeconomic conditions using the logarithm of 
GDP per capita (LNGDPC) and GDP growth (GDPG). Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the 
control variables.  The data sources for the control variables are given in Appendix 1. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1  National elections and the choice of debt sources 
We estimate the following multivariate model to study the relationship between national 
elections and bank debt ratio: 
, , . , , , , , , ,_ / _ _ *i c j t c t i c j t j c t i c j tBANK LOAN TOTAL DEBT ELEC DUMMY CONTROLS γ λ η ε= + + + +      (1) 
Where BANK_LOAN/TOTAL_DEBT is our dependent variable and ELEC_DUMMY is our 
proxy for political uncertainty.  CONTROLS include the following control variables discussed in 
section 3.2. jγ , cλ , and tγ  are industry, country, and year dummies. , , ,i c j tε  is the error term. 
Table 4 reports the OLS results of estimating several specifications of equation (1). The 
results of our basic Model 1show that the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. This finding suggests that firms tend to rely more on bank debt during election 
years. Moving ELEC_DUMMY from 0 to 1 (i.e., from a non-election to an election year) increases 
the bank debt ratio by 0.012, which represents a 2.84% increase relative to the average of bank debt 
ratio.  We can interpret this finding to imply that elections related to high political uncertainty 
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aggravate the information asymmetry problem. This leads to more capital rationing, and an 
increase in the public debt financing cost (e.g., Cao et al., 2013; Gao and Qi, 2013). 
In Model 2, we re-estimate equation (1) using a Tobit model to address the issue related to 
the fact that BANK_LOAN/TOTAL_DEBT takes values between 0 and 1. The results illustrate that 
the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY loads again positive and significant at the 1% level, confirming 
our earlier findings. In Model 3, we use a weighted least square model to address issues related to 
the unbalanced nature of our sample. The results depict that ELEC_DUMMY continues to load 
positive and significant. In Model 4, we cluster standard errors by country to address issues 
related to cross-country heterogeneities. The results reported in Model 4 show that our previous 
findings remain qualitatively unchanged.  
We find that several control variables have significant coefficients. For instance, we find that 
the coefficients for SIZE, LEVERAGE, Z-SCORE, ACOV, AQ and LNGDPC are negative and 
significant, implying that larger, more levered firms and firms with fewer financial constraints, 
higher analyst coverage, higher earnings quality and from high-income countries use less bank 
debt.  
[Please Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.2 The impact of information opacity 
 In Table 5, we split our sample based on information opacity. We use two opacity proxies. 
First, we use the number of analysts following a firm (ACOV) as a proxy for information opacity.  
Analyst coverage is negatively related to information asymmetry costs.  Since the literature 
suggests that information opacity increases the cost of public debt, we expect that firms with low 
analyst coverage use more bank debt during election years.  Consistent with this view, we find, in 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 5, that the ELEC_DUMMY loads positive and significantly higher in the 
set of firms having low ACOV. 
Second, we use the standard deviation of earnings (STDEV_EARNINGS) and research and 
development expenses divided by sales (R&D/SALES) as proxies of information opacity. A higher 
value for STDEV_EARNINGS indicates higher earnings volatility, hence higher information 
opacity. A higher value for R&D/SALES also coincides with higher information opacity. Indeed, 
the uncertainty about the success of research and development expenses is associated with higher 
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information opacity. The results reported in Models from 3 to 6 of Table 5 show that the coefficient 
for ELEC_DUMMY is statistically higher in the subsample of firms with high STDEV_EARNINGS 
and R&D/SALES when compared to the subsample of firms with low STDEV_EARNINGS and 
R&D/SALES, further supporting H2.  
[Please Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3 The effect of financial constraints 
We split our sample based on three financial constraint proxies. A dummy variable, 
(DIV_POS) equal to one if the firms distribute dividends and zero otherwise, is our first proxy for 
financial constraints. Firms that do not pay dividends are more financially constrained. The results 
reported in Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 indicate the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY is significantly 
higher when DIV_POS=0, supporting H3. This finding suggests that financially constrained firms 
are more affected by information asymmetry problems associated with national elections, hence 
tend to use more bank than public debt. Firm size (SIZE) calculated as the natural logarithm of 
total assets in U.S. dollars is our second proxy for financial constraint. Small firms that are more 
financially constrained in constrast to large firms, hence are more likely to use bank debt. 
Consistent with this view, we find in Models 3 and 4 of Table 6 that the coefficient for 
ELEC_DUMMY is higher in the sub-sample of firms with small SIZE. Finally, we use firm 
profitability (ROA) calculated as net income divided by total assets as the third proxy for financial 
constraint. Less profitable firms are more financially constrained. The results reported in Models 5 
and 6 of Table 6 illustrate that the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY is higher in the low ROA sub-
sample, consistent with H3. This implies that the positive association between national elections 
and bank debt ratio is more pronounced in less profitable firms (i.e., more financially constrained 
firms).  
[Please Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.4 The effect of legal protection 
We use several proxies for legal protection.  First, we use the legal system and property 
rights index (LEGAL_SYSTEM) from the Fraser Institute as a proxy for shareholder rights 
protection. A higher score indicates stronger shareholder protection rights.  In Models 1 and 2 of 
Table 7, we observe the positive coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY is significantly higher in the 
subsample of firms with low LEGAL_SYSTEM, consistent with H4. These findings suggest that 
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firms located in countries with weak investor protection use more bank debt during periods of 
high political uncertainty.  
Second, we use a proxy for labor protection, namely the Fraser Institute’s Labor Market 
Regulation Index (LMR). Higher values of LMR indicate more protective labor regulations.  Strong 
labor protection increases the incentives of managers to hide corporate resources (e.g., Hillary, 
2006) to reduce the ability of employees to extract corporate resources in the form of high wages 
and highly favorable working conditions.  Thus, under strong labor protection, firms use more 
public debt.  Consistent with this view, we find in Models 3 and 4 of Table 7 that the coefficient for 
ELEC_DUMMY is positive and significant (at the 1% level) only in the low LMR subsample. Also, 
we find the positive coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY to be higher in the low LMR subsample, 
suggesting that countries with weaker labor regulations substitute away public debt toward bank 
debt. Overall, these findings support H4, suggesting that the positive relationship between national 
elections and the degree of reliance on bank debt is more pronounced in firms from countries with 
weak labor protection. 
Third, we use the creditor rights index (CR) from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007).  
This index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights).  Strong creditor rights 
are associated with a lower cost of public debt (e.g., Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010) since they 
protect credit suppliers against borrower expropriation. Firms with low CR are more likely to use 
bank debt. We find the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY in Models 5 and 6 of Table 7 to be positive 
and significant at the 1% level only in the low CR subsample, consistent with H4. 
[Please Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.5 The degree of political uncertainty and national governance 
 In Table 8, we use three proxies for the degree of political uncertainty. First, we use a 
dummy variable (CLOSE) equal to one if elections are closely contested and zero otherwise. The 
election outcome is less predictable in closely contested elections (e.g., Julio and Yook, 2012), 
which increases political uncertainty. A high degree of political uncertainty aggravates 
information asymmetry problems and leads to more capital rationing during election years, which 
is linked with a higher public debt cost. We report a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% 




Second, we use the voice and accountability index (VOICE) from World Governance 
Indicators (WGI). The index measures how the citizens are able to select the government and the 
freedom of expression, association and media. A higher score indicates a high level of democracy 
and freedom. Stronger national governance reduces the need for monitoring from banks and 
mitigates agency as well as information asymmetry problems, which can facilitate the access of 
firms to public debt and reduces the degree of reliance on bank debt. In line with this argument, 
we find that the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY in Models 3 and 4 of Table 8 is positive and 
significant at the 1% level only in the low VOICE subsample, consistent with H5.  
Third, we use an alternative proxy for national governance, namely the political stability 
index (POLSTAB) from WGI. The index assesses the political stability of the country and the risk of 
politically motivated violence including terrorism. A higher score indicates strong national 
governance. As can be seen in Models 5 and 6 of Table 8, the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY loads 
positive and significant only in the subsample of firms with low POLSTAB, consistent with H5.  
Additionally, we find that ELEC_DUMMY loads negative and significant at the 1% level in 
the high VOICE and POLSTAB and sub-samples (Models 3 and 5 of Table 8), suggesting that firms 
located in countries with strong national governance use less bank debt during the national 
elections period. Based on this, we can see national governance and bank debt as substitutes. In 
fact, shareholder need less bank monitoring to discipline managers when national governance is 
strong. Collectively, the results of this section imply that firms from countries where elections are 
strongly contested and national governance are weak use more bank debt during election years. 
 [Please Insert Table 8 about here] 
4.6 Additional controls 
We include additional variables to ensure that our results are not affected by potential 
omitted variables.4 First, we control for the political rights index (POLRIGHTS) from Freedom 
House (2014). A higher score is associated with tighter constraints on the government. It is more 
                                                          
4  For the sake of brevity, we do not report the correlation matrix of the time-invariant country variables. 
This is available upon request.  Here, we find that some of time-invariant country variables are highly 
correlated. For instance, the coefficient of correlation between CR and REV_ANTIDR is equal 0.639 and 
the coefficient of correlation between CORRUPTION and PUBLIC_ENF is equal to -0.520. To alleviate 
the multicollinarity problem, we include the time-invariant country-level control variables one by one 
in Table 8. 
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difficult for the executive branch of the government to obtain approval from the legislative and 
judicial branches and pass the declared reforms under political systems with strong political 
constraints (i.e., higher checks and balances). Therefore, tight political constraints on the 
government are associated with higher political uncertainty.  As can be observed in Model 1 of 
Table 9, POLRIGHTS loads positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms from 
countries with politically constrained governments use more bank debt. More importantly, for our 
purposes, we find that ELEC_DUMMY continues to load positive and significant. 
Second, we control for corruption using the ICRG's assessment of corruption in a 
government (CORRUPTION). The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of corruption in a country. We report (in Model 2 of Table 9) a positive and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level for CORRUPTION, suggesting that firms located in countries with a high 
level of corruption use bank debt more. This result implies that shareholders of firms from 
countries with highly corrupted governments prefer to rely on bank debt because banks have 
strong incentives and the ability to monitor managers. More interestingly, ELEC_DUMMY is still 
positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Third, we control for legal institutions using the revised anti-director rights index 
(REV_ANTIDR) from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez- de – Silanes and Shleifer (2008). A higher index is 
associated with stronger shareholder rights protection. We also use the legal enforcement of 
contracts index (PUBLIC_ENF) from the Fraser Institute. A higher score for PUBLIC_ENF indicates 
more efficient enforcement contracts in the country. The results for these tests, as reported in 
Models 4 and 5 of Table 9, illustrate that ELEC_DUMMY is again positive and significant at the 1% 
level, supporting our previous findings. In Model 6, we include all the additional control variables 
in the same regression. Our main results remain qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that our 
findings are not affected by multicollinearity problems. 
[Please Insert Table 9 about here] 
4.7 Robustness checks 
In this section, we perform several tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, we 
segregate our results for firms from countries where election timing is not fixed (e.g., Greece and 
Italy) and countries where election timing is not flexible. In countries with flexible timing elections 
(e.g., Greece and Italy), the government may be forced to step down due to financial/economic 
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issues that can also influence the decision to use bank debt. The results reported in Models 1 and 2 
of Panel A in Table 10 depict that the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY is positive and significant at 
the 1% level only for the sub-sample of firms from countries with fixed election timing. This 
suggests that the impact of political uncertainty on the bank debt ratio is more pronounced when 
election timing is fixed. 
Second, we re-run our basic model separately for the high and low leverage sub-samples. 
The results are reported in Models 3 and 4 of Panel A in Table 10. We find that the coefficient for 
ELEC_DUMMY loads positive and significant at the 1% level in both sub-samples. This suggests 
that studying the impact of national elections on the level of debt (e.g., Colak et al., 2018) is 
different from studying the composition of debt. Examining debt choice is important because the 
total amount of debt may remain constant while the composition of debt (i.e., the allocation of the 
total amount of debt between the bank and public debt) may change.  
Third, we appraise the effect of the 2008–09 financial crisis. Our results for the period 
preceding the crisis and the period following the crisis are reported in Models 5 and 6 of Panel A 
in Table 10. We find that ELEC_DUMMY is positive and significant at the 1% level for both the 
pre-crisis subsample and the post-crisis subsample. However, it is higher in the post-crisis period.   
In Panel B of Table 10, we perform additional tests. First, we only use the sub-sample of 
large firms. The intuition is that small firms are not qualified to raise public debt. The results for 
this test are reported in Model 1 of Panel B in Table 10 show that ELEC_DUMMY loads positive 
and significant, suggesting that our findings are not driven by small firms. Second, we exclude 
countries that represent a large proportion of the observations of our sample (i.e., U.S.A., Japan, 
and India) to mitigate concerns that our results are driven by large countries. The results reported 
in Model 2 of Panel B in Table 10 show that the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY loads positive and 
significant at the 1% level, reducing the concern that our earlier results are driven by the 
overrepresentation of firms from these countries. Third, we exclude observations with a zero bank 
debt over the total debt ratio to ensure that our findings are not affected by the inclusion of firms 
with neutral banks over the total debt ratio. The results of this test are reported in Model 3 of Panel 
B in Table 10. We find that the positive and significant for ELEC_DUMMY persists, again 
confirming our earlier findings. 
[Please insert Table 10 about here] 
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Additionally, we use alternative uncertainty proxy. Indeed, we use general macroeconomic 
uncertainty as a measure of policy uncertainty instead of national elections.  Specifically, we use 
the newly-based EPU index developed by Baker et al. (2016).5 It reflects the beliefs of the media on 
macroeconomic policy. The EPU index has limited coverage. Indeed, it is available for 18 
countries, which reduces our sample size. The results reported in Model 1 of Table 11 show that 
the coefficient for EPU is positive and significant at the 1% level, confirming our earlier findings. 
We also use the ratio of bank debt over total assets (BANK_DEBT/TOTAL_ASSETS) as a proxy for 
the degree of reliance on bank debt instead of (BANK_DEBT/TOTAL_DEBT). The results, reported 
in Model 2 of Table 11, show that the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY continues to load positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that our findings are not driven by a specific proxy for the 
degree of reliance on bank debt. 
Finally, we argue that changes in the debt mix are driven by changes in the supply of bank 
loans and bonds. Specifically, we argue that national elections increase political uncertainty, which 
aggravates information asymmetry problems and increases capital rationing. Such an increase 
results in a switch from public debt to bank debt. However, changes in debt mix are driven by 
changes in bank loan and bond supply and also changes in the firm’ s relative demand for loans 
and bonds. Therefore, changes in debt mix may be driven by changes in the bank loan and bond 
demand (i.e., the fact that firms did not apply for bank loans and bonds) and not to changes in the 
bank loan and bond supply (i.e., the fact that firms did not get new funding). To rule out this 
possibility, we exclude firms that did not receive new funding (i.e., either bank loan or bonds), in 
line with Becker and Ivashina (2014). We create a dummy variable equal to one if the firm issued 
bank debt in a given year and zero otherwise (BANK_DEBT_ISSUE). The results of the logit 
regression of BANK_DEBT_ISSUE on the election dummy and the control variables are reported in 
Model 3 of Table 11. As we can see, the coefficient for ELEC_DUMMY loads positive and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that national elections increase the likelihood that firms 
issue new bank debt. This finding implies that our results are driven by changes in the bank loan 
and bond supply and not by changes in the demand for bank loans and bonds.  
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 
 
                                                          
5 We calculate EPU as the average of monthly country news based uncertainty indexes. 
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5.  Conclusion 
This study advances the capital markets focused literature dealing with the economic 
outcomes of political uncertainty (e.g., Boutchkova et al., 2012; Julio and Yook, 2012; Pastor and 
Veronesi, 2012, 2013; Durnev, 2014; Cao et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2015; Kelly et al., 2016; Colak et 
al., 2017; Kaviani et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018 ). We focus on how national elections impact an 
important financing decision, namely the composition of debt. Using a multinational sample of 
firms from 35 countries over the period 1990–2015, we show that firms substitute bank debt for 
public debt in election years. This result is consistent with the view that elections that are 
associated with a high degree of political uncertainty aggravating information asymmetry and 
thus leading firms to use less public debt during election years.  
We find that the positive association between national elections and bank debt ratio is more 
pronounced in opaque firms, more financially constrained firms and firms from countries with 
weaker shareholder rights, labor protection and creditor rights. Furthermore, we discover the 
influence of national elections on the use of bank debt is more profound when elections are closely 
contested and in countries with weak national governance. Collectively, our paper contributes to 
the body of empirical studies on capital structure by providing novel evidence concerning the 
impact of national elections on debt structure. Prior literature focuses on firm leverage (e.g., Colak 
et al., 2018). We contribute to this literature by studying the composition of debt instead of only 
examining debt leverage. This contribution is important because the composition of debt may 
vary, while the total amount of debt remains constant (Rauh and Sufi, 2010). We also add to the 
growing body of evidence on the effect of policy on financial markets by focusing on an important 
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Table 1: Definitions and data Sources  
Variable Description Source 
BANK_LOAN/TOTAL_DEBT The ratio of bank debt over total debt Capital IQ 
ELEC_DUMMY 
A dummy variable equal to one if the 
election is held in the period between 60 
days before fiscal year-end and  274 days 
after the fiscal year-end, in line with Julio 
and Yook (2012). 
The Database of 
Political Institutions 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets in U.S. dollars. 
Authors' 
calculation 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt divided by total assets. Authors' calculation 
Q 
Total assets less the book value of equity 




ROA Net income divided by total assets. Authors' calculation 
TANGABILITY Property, plant, and equipment net divided by total assets. 
Authors' 
calculation 
Z_SCORE A dummy variable equal to one if Altman’s (1968) Z-score is different from zero.  
Authors' 
calculation 
ACOV The logarithm of one plus analyst coverage. I/B/E/S 
AQ The absolute value of discretionary accruals. Authors' calculation 
LNGDPC The logarithm of GDP per capita. WDI 
GDPG GDP growth. WDI 
STDEV_EARNINGS The standard deviation of earnings per share. 
Authors' 
calculation 
R&D/SALES Research and development expenses divided by total sales. 
Authors' 
calculation 





Legal system and property rights index.  
 
Fraser Institute 




An index of creditor rights developed by 
Djankov, McLeish, and Schleifer (2007).  
Djankov et al. 
(2007) 
CLOSE A dummy variable equal to one if elections are closely contested and zero otherwise. 
Authors' 
calculation 
VOICE The voice and accountability index. WGI 
POLSTAB The political stability index. WGI 
POLRIGHTS The political rights index. Freedom House (2014) 
CORRUPTION The corruption in a government index.  ICRG 
REV_ANTIDR The revised anti-directors index. Djankov et al. (2008) 
PUBLIC_ENF 
The legal enforcement of contracts index. Fraser Institute 
EPU The average of monthly new-based policy uncertainty indexes. Baker et al. (2016) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Country 
This table presents the distribution of the number of observations, bank debt ratio, and the 
number of elections, by country. The full sample comprises 219,999 firm-year observations from 
35 countries for the period 1990–2015.  
Country Number of Number of BANK_DEBT/TOTAL_DEBT 
 
Elections Observations   
Australia 7 6957 0.52 
Austria 5 839 0.51 
Belgium 6 1202 0.45 
Brazil 2 1606 0.63 
Colombia 7 181 0.45 
Denmark 6 1408 0.58 
Finland 6 1586 0.54 
France 4 7562 0.46 
Germany 1 6366 0.53 
Greece 7 2220 0.53 
India 4 15654 0.67 
Indonesia 5 2917 0.52 
Ireland 2 382 0.50 
Israel 8 1417 0.60 
Italy 6 2198 0.60 
Japan 9 44742 0.45 
Kenya 5 200 0.69 
Mexico 5 725 0.45 
Netherlands 7 1453 0.46 
New Zealand 6 854 0.58 
Norway 3 1797 0.49 
Peru 2 500 0.54 
Philippines 6 1061 0.59 
Poland 5 2495 0.63 
Portugal 10 593 0.44 
Singapore 5 5606 0.61 
South Korea 3 8230 0.27 
Spain 5 1455 0.51 
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Sri Lanka 5 1287 0.70 
Sweden 6 2922 0.59 
Switzerland 9 2337 0.44 
Thailand 5 4557 0.60 
Turkey 7 1432 0.73 
U.K. 4 12202 0.48 
U.S.A. 5 73056 0.25 





Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for our variables. Our sample includes 219,999 firm-
year observations from 35 countries for the period 1990–2015.  
Variable 
N Mean Median Standard Q1 Q3 
   deviation   
BANK_DEBT/TOTAL_DEBTt 219,999 0.423 0.230 0.440 0.000 0.950 
ELEC_DUMMYt 219,999 0.262 0.000 0.440 0.000 1.000 
SIZEt 219,999 5.616 5.504 2.132 4.186 6.916 
LEVERAGEt 219,999 0.256 0.234 0.184 0.108 0.371 
Qt 219,999 1.534 1.152 1.543 0.916 1.614 
ROAt 219,999 0.078 0.090 0.118 0.043 0.140 
TANGABILITYt 219,999 0.590 0.542 0.380 0.281 0.845 
Z_SCOREt 219,999 0.229 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.000 
ACOV 219,999 2.328 0.000 4.334 0.000 3.000 
AQ 219,999 0.180 0.079 0.305 0.033 0.183 
LNGDPC 219,999 10.098 10.495 1.098 10.146 10.699 
GDPG 219,999 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.014 0.039 
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Table 4: Main Evidence 
This table presents regression results of the impact of political uncertainty on the choice 
of debt source. Our sample comprises of 219,999 firm-year observations from 35 
countries for the period 1990–2015. We include industry, year, and country dummies in 
all models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The t-statistic values 
are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding coefficient. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to 
Table 1 for a description of the data sources and variables definitions. The t-statistic 
values are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding coefficient. 
Variable 
Basic Tobit WLS Clustering by 
Model Model regression Country 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ELEC_DUMMYt 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.019** 
 
(9.114) (6.772) (6.288) (2.655) 
SIZEt -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(-14.555) (-7.546) (-31.905) (-3.045) 
LEVERAGEt -0.000 -0.099*** 0.001 -0.015 
 
(-0.017) (-5.203) (0.114) (-0.814) 
Qt -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.004 
 
(-2.939) (-2.749) (-5.549) (-1.371) 
ROAt 0.189*** 0.415*** 0.184*** 0.197*** 
 
(16.255) (14.280) (24.744) (7.295) 
TANGABILITYt 0.009** 0.013 0.013*** 0.015* 
 
(2.089) (1.461) (6.126) (1.818) 
Z_SCOREt -0.008** -0.013* -0.010*** -0.018** 
 
(-2.483) (-1.905) (-4.481) (-2.217) 
ACOVt -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
(-12.209) (-12.862) (-26.166) (-3.461) 
AQt -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.017*** 
 
(-6.442) (-4.943) (-7.371) (-4.786) 
LNGDPCt -0.158*** -0.377*** -0.159*** -0.058*** 
 
(-23.832) (-22.199) (-35.605) (-3.059) 
GDPGt 0.826*** 0.462*** 0.818*** 0.502 
 
(18.265) (4.174) (20.055) (0.757) 
Intercept 1.662*** 1.832*** 1.312*** 0.587*** 
 
(24.903) (7.270) (39.750) (3.046) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 




Pseudo R2/Adjusted    0.332     
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Table 5: Impact of Information Opacity 
This table presents cross-sectional tests based on information opacity proxies. Our sample comprises of 219,999 firm-year 
observations from 35 countries for the period 1990–2015. We include industry, year, and country dummies in all models. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding 
coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Table 1 for a 
description of the data sources and variables definitions. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the 
corresponding coefficient. 
Variable 
ACOV   STDEV_EARNINGS   R&D/SALES 
High Low  High Low 
 
High Low 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 




(9.300) (13.173)  (8.038) (1.441) 
 
(8.453) (3.767) 




(-9.706) (-5.685)  (-6.097) (-13.293) 
 
(-8.199) (-12.247) 




(-2.314) (-0.824)  (-1.300) (0.556) 
 
(-1.901) (1.225) 




(0.150) (-6.603)  (0.038) (-3.911) 
 
(-0.142) (-3.543) 




(8.417) (11.552)  (3.257) (14.607) 
 
(9.938) (12.160) 




(3.935) (4.433)  (2.848) (-0.638) 
 
(2.405) (-0.148) 









 -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
-0.006*** -0.003*** 
   
 (-7.084) (-9.344) 
 
(-10.633) (-6.066) 









LNGDPCt -0.031*** -0.029***  -0.178*** -0.081*** 
 
-0.204*** -0.113*** 
 (-9.871) (-15.950)  (-19.799) (-5.372) 
 
(-18.824) (-12.707) 
GDPGt 0.145 -0.186***  0.644*** 0.858*** 
 
0.741*** 0.730*** 
 (1.613) (-2.720)  (10.172) (10.561) 
 
(9.143) (13.313) 




(17.836) (17.931)  (18.140) (6.479) 
 
(19.564) (13.504) 
Difference test for coefficients 15.17***  9.93*** 
 
7.95** 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Country FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
N 97,431 122,568  92,563 92,522 
 
98,354 121,645 




Table 6: Effect of Financial Constraints 
This table presents cross-sectional tests based on financial constraints proxies. Our sample comprises of 219,999 firm-year 
observations from 35 countries for the period 1990–2015. We include industry, year, and country dummies in all models. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding 
coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Table 1 for a 
description of the data sources and variables definitions. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the 
corresponding coefficient. 
Variable 
DIV_POS   SIZE   PROFITABILITY 
1 0  High Low 
 
High Low 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 




(5.998) (6.679)  (2.054) (5.581) 
 
(4.841) (6.982) 




(-13.416) (-9.876)  (-19.928) (6.079) 
 
(-17.494) (-5.435) 




(-0.211) (-3.307)  (-3.835) (1.192) 
 
(1.001) (-1.883) 




(-1.788) (-7.373)  (-0.747) (-4.916) 
 
(0.444) (-1.646) 




(9.292) (13.482)  (3.298) (11.877) 
 
(-1.782) (11.911) 




(-2.165) (0.052)  (-2.507) (0.112) 
 
(1.756) (2.416) 




(-2.343) (-1.217)  (1.818) (-4.175) 
 
(-3.381) (-0.884) 




(-10.852) (-8.813)  (-10.676) (-5.409) 
 
(-8.190) (-9.454) 









LNGDPCt -0.033*** -0.019***  -0.034*** -0.036*** 
 
-0.082*** -0.224*** 
 (-9.415) (-5.729)  (-7.535) (-11.351) 
 
(-8.240) (-25.942) 
GDPGt -1.671*** -1.108***  -2.211*** -1.188*** 
 
0.769*** 0.901*** 
 (-10.513) (-8.413)  (-15.019) (-8.508) 
 
(11.457) (13.841) 




(10.710) (6.565)  (12.679) (8.056) 
 
(10.312) (25.660) 
Difference test for coefficients 7.24***  6.59*** 
 
13.45*** 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Country FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
N 114,876 105,123  110,000 109,999 
 
110,000 109,999 
R-squared 0.449 0.296   0.404 0.348   0.439 0.426 
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Table 7: Role of Legal Protection  
This table presents cross-sectional tests based on legal variables. Our sample comprises of 219,999 firm-year observations from 35 
countries for the period 1990–2015. We include industry, year, and country dummies in all models. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding coefficient. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Table 1 for a description of the data sources 
and variables definitions. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding coefficient. 
Variable 
LEGAL_SYSTEM   LMR   CR 
High Low  High Low 
 
High Low 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 




(8.219) (11.568)  (3.375) (9.599) 
 
(-8.998) (10.663) 




(-7.885) (-10.778)  (-8.955) (-8.219) 
 
(-5.611) (-13.325) 




(-1.624) (0.097)  (-0.063) (-0.188) 
 
(1.871) (-1.234) 




(0.083) (-4.693)  (-1.245) (-3.207) 
 
(-3.308) (-2.019) 




(14.740) (9.247)  (14.252) (8.384) 
 
(8.882) (13.880) 




(1.637) (3.275)  (0.983) (1.720) 
 
(-0.248) (2.727) 




(-3.283) (-1.563)  (-2.691) (-0.413) 
 
(1.219) (-3.473) 




(-7.757) (-12.567)  (-13.622) (-1.583) 
 
(1.738) (-13.146) 









LNGDPCt -0.009*** 0.005**  -0.164*** 0.012 
 
-0.055** -0.191*** 
 (-3.552) (1.976)  (-17.006) (0.890) 
 
(-2.485) (-25.428) 
GDPGt 0.156*** 0.283***  1.548*** 0.123* 
 
0.540*** 1.033*** 
 (2.783) (3.017)  (27.240) (1.689) 
 
(6.342) (18.470) 




(7.171) (0.610)  (15.634) (0.314) 
 
(2.433) (25.927) 
Difference test for coefficients 11.85***  18.07*** 
 
14.85** 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Country FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
N 128,026 91,973  129,927 90,072 
 
122,773 97,226 




Table 8: Degree of Political Uncertainty 
This table presents cross-sectional tests based on political uncertainty proxies. Our sample comprises of 219,999 firm-year 
observations from 35 countries for the period 1990–2015. We include industry, year, and country dummies in all models. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding 
coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Table 1 for a 
description of the data sources and variables definitions. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the 
corresponding coefficient. 
Variable 
CLOSE   VOICE   POLSTAB 
1 0  High Low 
 
High Low 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 




(-0.549) (6.094)  (-3.455) (11.579) 
 
(-5.884) (1.902) 




(-10.602) (-8.652)  (-16.710) (-3.725) 
 
(-5.716) (-7.481) 




(-1.048) (1.388)  (-0.104) (-1.002) 
 
(0.348) (-3.035) 




(-1.159) (-4.718)  (-4.284) (-6.759) 
 
(-5.177) (-3.487) 




(12.717) (10.682)  (18.063) (6.279) 
 
(7.821) (13.458) 




(0.820) (1.703)  (-1.280) (2.075) 
 
(3.069) (-0.115) 




(-1.057) (-1.981)  (-1.962) (-0.352) 
 
(-0.572) (-3.649) 




(-11.988) (-7.686)  (-16.180) (-10.732) 
 
(-9.167) (-17.752) 




(-4.851) (-3.013)  (-6.394) (-4.040) 
 
(-3.823) (-5.018) 





 (-2.602) (-27.157)  (-9.857) (-19.396) 
 
(-4.427) (-33.694) 
GDPGt 0.443*** 0.509***  -1.122*** 1.116*** 
 
0.013 -1.534*** 
 (5.510) (7.516)  (-6.579) (15.011) 
 
(0.141) (-15.241) 




(4.116) (26.946)  (11.239) (17.210) 
 
(5.146) (30.273) 
Difference test for coefficients 11.06***  24.64***  
18.20*** 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Country FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
N 110,159 109,840  87,419 89,853 
 
86,838 90,434 




Table 9: Additional Controls 
This table presents our regression results while controlling for additional variables. Our sample comprises of 219,999 firm-year 
observations from 35 countries for the period 1990–2015. We include industry, year, and country dummies in all models. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding 
coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Table 1 for a 
description of the data sources and variables definitions. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses below the 
corresponding coefficient. 
Variable 
POLRIGHTS CORRUPTION CR REV_ANTIDR PUBLIC_ENF ALL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ELEC_DUMMYt 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 
(9.085) (8.550) (9.169) (9.448) (14.538) (13.885) 
SIZEt -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(-14.544) (-14.352) (-14.574) (-14.631) (-10.724) (-10.763) 
LEVERAGEt 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.009 -0.005 
 
(0.008) (0.272) (0.024) (0.112) (-0.813) (-0.422) 
Qt -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(-2.932) (-2.898) (-2.952) (-3.012) (-3.393) (-3.437) 
ROAt 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.223*** 0.225*** 
 
(16.242) (16.246) (16.255) (16.239) (15.190) (15.215) 
TANGABILITYt 0.009** 0.008* 0.009** 0.009** 0.010* 0.009* 
 
(2.076) (1.853) (2.066) (2.111) (1.912) (1.714) 
Z_SCOREt -0.008** -0.009*** -0.008** -0.009** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 
(-2.500) (-2.688) (-2.501) (-2.545) (-2.864) (-3.074) 
ACOVt -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
(-12.202) (-12.387) (-12.197) (-12.115) (-13.531) (-13.494) 
AQt -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 
(-6.426) (-6.453) (-6.434) (-6.424) (-6.163) (-6.133) 
LNGDPCt -0.158*** -0.157*** -0.159*** -0.163*** -0.139*** -0.145*** 
 
(-23.843) (-23.576) (-23.845) (-24.206) (-15.486) (-15.860) 
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GDPGt 0.813*** 0.968*** 0.825*** 0.822*** 0.020 0.102 
 
(18.113) (20.690) (18.237) (18.065) (0.301) (1.556) 
POLRIGHTSt 0.007*** 


































    
-0.078*** -0.076*** 
     
(-21.280) (-21.172) 
Intercept 1.615*** 1.636*** 1.528*** 1.345*** 2.077*** 2.086*** 
 
(23.518) (24.447) (22.365) (16.991) (21.411) (19.571) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 219,999 218,582 219,799 218,512 173,931 171,133 




Table 10: Robustness Results 
This table presents regression results of robustness tests. This table presents cross-sectional tests based on legal variables. Our sample 
comprises of 219,999 firm-year observations from 35 countries for the period 1990–2015. We include industry, year, and country 
dummies in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses 
below the corresponding coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please 
refer to Table 1 for a description of the data sources and variables definitions. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses 
below the corresponding coefficient. 
Panel A: Sensitivity test 
Variable 
Timing  Leverage 
 
Pre- vs. Post-crisis 
Flexible Fixed  High Low 
 
Period 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 




(12.716) (-3.380)  (7.288) (6.568) 
 
(10.121) (3.019) 




(-4.214) (-10.953)  (-11.637) (-9.387) 
 
(-10.774) (-6.476) 




(3.616) (-3.135)  (-8.486) (9.845) 
 
(-0.846) (0.006) 




(-4.870) (-0.882)  (-5.287) (-3.268) 
 
(0.601) (-3.314) 




(6.470) (14.210)  (11.458) (13.963) 
 
(12.545) (7.457) 




(1.677) (0.845)  (2.239) (-0.846) 
 
(2.644) (0.545) 




(-3.554) (-0.816)  (0.804) (-3.672) 
 
(-2.783) (-0.946) 













(-3.433) (-5.221)  (-4.230) (-4.193) 
 
(-5.319) (-2.879) 
LNGDPCt -0.144*** -0.126***  -0.080*** -0.067*** 
 
-0.169*** -0.106*** 
 (-18.698) (-7.970)  (-20.026) (-14.930) 
 
(-16.076) (-7.835) 
GDPGt 0.147** 1.565***  0.820*** 0.608*** 
 
0.844*** 0.667*** 
 (2.422) (18.213)  (12.834) (6.955) 
 
(12.913) (7.850) 




(17.914) (9.201)  (21.227) -14.27 
 
(17.098) (7.306) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Country FE YES YES  YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 115,703 104,296  109,999 110,000 
 
111,344 72,420 
R-squared 0.471 0.331  0.450 0.373 
 
0.430 0.353 
Panel B: Alternative samples 
Variable 
Excluding Excluding Excluding firms with 
small large a zero bank 
firms countries debt ratio 
(1) (2) (3) 
ELEC_DUMMYt 0.012*** 0.061*** 0.008** 
 
(6.921) (11.453) (1.951) 
SIZEt -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.041*** 
 
(-18.547) (-18.389) (-28.395) 
LEVERAGEt -0.041*** 0.032** -0.141*** 
 
(-3.188) (2.264) (-13.121) 
Qt 0.001 -0.009*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.756) (-5.718) (-3.089) 
ROAt 0.119*** 0.162*** 0.105*** 
 
(4.050) (7.983) (6.842) 
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TANGABILITYt 0.008 -0.004 -0.009* 
 
(1.309) (-0.610) (-1.772) 
Z_SCOREt 0.009* -0.023*** 0.008** 
 
(1.803) (-4.360) (2.011) 
ACOVt -0.004*** -0.001 -0.006*** 
 
(-9.661) (-1.295) (-10.084) 
AQt -0.015*** 0.024*** 0.001 
 
(-3.092) (5.356) (0.212) 
LNGDPCt -0.229*** 0.018*** 0.006** 
 
(-22.645) (6.185) (2.316) 
GDPGt 0.809*** -1.572*** -0.087 
 
(11.905) (-14.021) (-0.903) 
Intercept 2.531*** -0.081** 0.745*** 
 
(24.197) (-2.377) (4.817) 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
N 110,000 99,284 123,360 






Table 11: Alternative uncertainty and bank debt ratio proxies 
This table presents regression results while using alternative proxies for political uncertainty and bank debt ratio. Our sample 
comprises of 219,999 firm-year observations from 35 countries for the period 1990–2015. We include industry, year, and country 
dummies in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses 
below the corresponding coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please 
refer to Table 1 for a description of the data sources and variables definitions. The t-statistic values are reported in the parentheses 
below the corresponding coefficient. 
Variable 
Alternative uncertainty proxy 
  
Alternative bank debt ratio proxy 
EPU BANK_DEBT/TOTAL_ASSETS BANK_DEBT_ISSUE 
(1) (2) (3) 
EPUt 0.001***   
 
 (3.423)   
 ELEC_DUMMYt   0.003*** 0.048*** 
 
  (7.543) (2.735) 
SIZEt -0.015***  -0.004*** 0.049*** 
 
(-14.092)  (-12.385) (8.854) 
LEVERAGEt -0.004  0.394*** 0.789*** 
 
(-0.479)  (89.871) (14.099) 
Qt -0.004***  0.001** -0.024** 
 
(-4.930)  (2.348) (-2.565) 
ROAt 0.200***  0.035*** 0.346*** 
 
(16.274)  (9.589) (3.655) 
TANGABILITYt -0.001  0.009*** 0.118*** 
 
(-0.312)  (6.342) (4.510) 
Z_SCOREt -0.008**  0.000 0.030 
 
(-2.070)  (0.177) (1.198) 
ACOVt -0.007***  -0.001*** 0.012*** 
 
(-16.266)  (-8.090) (4.947) 






(-5.679)  (-4.892) (1.361) 
LNGDPCt -0.305***  -0.038*** 0.480*** 
 
(-39.373)  (-13.875) (13.642) 
GDPGt 1.076***  0.312*** -0.026 
 
(16.309)  (16.993) (-0.073) 
Intercept 3.082***  0.293*** -6.635*** 
 
(39.211)  (10.626) (-17.247) 
Industry FE YES  YES YES 
Country FE YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES  YES  
N 189,701  219,999 99,245 
R-squared 0.429   0.470 0.081 
 
